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OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE IN LOUISIANA -
I. TO SHOW KNOWLEDGE, INTENT, SYSTEM, ETC. IN THE
CASE IN CHIEF
The Theory Behind the Rule
In general, all relevant evidence is admissible unless a
specific rule of policy forbids its use.' If, in the case in chief, the
state offers proof of other crimes committed by defendant, the
question arises whether this evidence is relevant to prove the
crime at issue.2 The fact that a defendant has committed another
crime has logical relevancy;8 it tends to show that he has a
"criminal disposition" and thus is more likely to have committed
this particular crime than a defendant without such a propensity.
If the evidence indicates that defendant has committed the same
type of crime, e.g., proof of another theft in a prosecution for
theft, the evidence has even greater relevancy.
Having determined that defendant's other crimes are rele-
vant, the next question is whether an existing policy forbids its
use. Evidence relevant solely to show a defendant's criminal
disposition is termed character evidence, and the state's use of
character evidence has generally been deemed to create an in-
ordinate risk of unjust convictions because of these factors: the
strong possibility of the jury convicting defendant merely be-
cause he is a bad man; the injustice of attacking defendant on
an issue for which he is probably unprepared; and the danger
of confusing the jury by proof of collateral issues.4 Since the
common law placed greater emphasis on protecting the innocent
accused rather than convicting the guilty, the rule early develop-
ed forbidding the state's proof of defendant's other crimes if the
1. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 184 (Cleary ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK]; J. WIGMORE, EVIDE3NCE § 10 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE]; see also Rule 402 of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.
2. Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND.
L. REv. 385 (1952).
3. "Relevant evidence" as used here means evidence having any tendency
in reason to prove any material fact. 2 WIGMORE § 216; UNFORM RULE OF
EVIDENCD 1.
4. 1 WIGMORN § 194; Stone, Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England,
46 HARV. L. Rv. 954 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Stone, England]; Thomas,




evidence is relevant only to show defendant's character. 5 With
minor variations, this rule has been adopted in all United States
jurisdictions."
Evidence inadmissible for one purpose may be admitted
when offered for another, proper use.7 Thus, while other crimes
evidence is inadmissible when relevant only to show defendant's
criminal disposition, it may be admissible if it bears some rele-
vancy independent of character.8 The majority of jurisdictions
have formulated a rule prohibiting any use of evidence referring
to a defendant's other crimes except when such evidence bears
the special relevancy of motive, intent, plan, knowledge or
identity.9 A minority of jurisdictions phrase the rule so as to
admit all relevant evidence unless its sole relevance is to show
the defendant's criminal disposition.'0 Regardless of the approach
used," it is generally recognized that the admissibility of defen-
dant's other crimes turns on the independent relevancy vel non
of the evidence to some material issue other than defendant's
character. 12
5. MCCORMICK H3 188, 190; 2 WIGMORE § 217; Stone, Exclusion of Similar
Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REv. 988, 991 (1938) [hereinafter cited
as Stone, America]; Stone, England, at 959.
6. MCCORMICK § 190; 2 WiOMORE § 216; Slough & Knightly, Other Vices,
Other Crimes, 41 IowA L. REV. 325, 326 (1956); Stone, America, at 996.
7. 1 WIOMoRE § 13; LA. R.S. 15:442 (1950).
8. MCCORMICK § 190; 1 WIOMORE § 217.
9. Slough & Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IOWA L. REv. 325,
326 (1956). The leading case articulating the majority rule Is People v.
Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901). For a historical development of
both forms of the rule see Stone, England and Stone, America. Generally,
the listed exceptions to exclusionary rule are considered illustrative, not
exhaustive. See McCoRMIcK § 190, at 448. Louisiana has codified the majority
rule in LA. R.S. 15:445, 446 (1950).
10. See Comment, 7 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 463 (1960) for an explanation of the
minority rule and its accompanying judicial approach. This minority ap-
proach has been adopted in UNIFORm RULE OF EVIDENCE 55 and MODEL CODE
oF EVmENCE rule 311 (1942).
11. For a critical analysis of the majority approach to the rule see
Gregg, Other Acts of Sexual Misbehavior and Perversion as Evidence in
Prosecutions for Sexual Offenses, 6 ARIz. L. REV. 212, 214 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Gregg, Sexual Offenses]; Lacy, Admissibility of Evidence of Crimes
Not Charged in the Indictment, 31 ORB. L. REV. 267, 272 (1952); Slough, Other
Vices, Other Crimes, An Evidentiary Dilemma, 20 U. KAN. L. REv. 411, 413
(1972); Stone, America, at 1007; Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-
A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REv. 385, 393 (1952); Comment, 70 YALE L.J.
763, 767 (1961). These authorities contend that courts tend to use the
enumerated exceptions of the majority rule as mechanical solutions to the
question of relevancy, thus omitting a sound Inquiry into the actual
relevance of the other crime to a material issue in the case.
12. McCoRMicK § 190, at 447; 2 WbuMoas § 217.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The Requirement of Independent Relevancy
As with any relevancy problem, there are few concrete rules.
Analysis of the more commonly used exceptions reveals the fol-
lowing factual relationships which have been deemed necessary
to constitute independent relevance.13
The state's proof of a plan or scheme is generally not an
essential element of the crime charged.14 However, the fact that
a defendant planned to commit the crime in question, as evi-
denced by a plan and action upon it, certainly renders more
probable the conclusion that defendant did commit that crime.
If the plan contemplated the commission of another crime, the
state's proof of this plan thus becomes a problem of other crimes
evidence. It is generally held that unless this alleged plan con-
templated both the other crime and the act charged in the indict-
ment, it is inadmissible. 1 5 These crimes need not be identical,
nor even similar, provided they were both part of a plot which
included the completion of the crime in question.1
Knowledge signifies an awareness of a fact. In some crimes,
it may be an element of the crime. For example, a prosecution
for receiving stolen property requires that defendant know the
property was stolen. Evidence that defendant knowingly bought
stolen property from the same person on a prior occasion is gen-
erally admissible. The connection between transactions (same
thief, similar circumstances) renders more probable the fact that
defendant was aware of the nature of the property at the later
transaction. Such evidence is independently relevant and ad-
missible to prove knowledge.' However, many authorities state
that even if knowledge is an element of the crime, where knowl-
13. Since Louisiana utilizes the majority approach, the writer has chosen
to discuss the permissible uses of other crimes evidence as exceptions to a
broad prohibition against any use of defendant's other crimes in the state's
case in chief.
14. Conspiracy is not considered here.
15. If the two crimes were not included in a single plan and are other-
wise unrelated to the crime charged, the only relevance of the evidence is
to show that defendant has committed other crimes and has a criminal dis-
position. A mere similarity between offenses has not been understood to
show a plan. 2 WoMORE § 300; Gregg, Sexual Offenses, at 229.
16. 2 WiOMORm § 304; Slough, Other Vices, Other Crimes: An Evtdentiary
Dilemma, 20 U. KAN. L. Rev. 411, 419 (1972); Slough & Knightly, Other
Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IowA L. Rzv. 325, 330 (1956); Comment, 36 TENN. L.
Rev. 515, 521 (1969); Comment, 7 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 463, 473 (1960).
17. Slough, Other Vices, Other Crimes: An Evidentlary Dilemma, 20
U. KAN. L. Rv. 411, 419 (1972).
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edge is implicit in the act itself, proof of knowledge should be
inadmissible."1 Of course, if the defendant's evidence disputes
this presumption of knowledge, the state may offer rebuttal
evidence.19 Where knowledge is not an element of the crime,
proof of it is irrelevant unless used to show some other material
fact.20
Although motive is never an essential element of a crime,
it is usually relevant. If the defendant had a particular reason
to accomplish a crime and. the crime was effected, proof of
defendant's motive renders more probable the fact that he was
the actor. 21 In order to have independent relevance, the motive
reflected by other crimes should be factually peculiar to the
victim and the crime charged.2 2
Intent refers to the state of mind with which an act is done
and is usually an essential element of the charge. Thus, other
crimes evidence may be admissible to prove this material fact.
It is conceivable that an act could have been innocently done
once, but where defendant is proved to have committed other
similar acts, the likelihood of innocent intent is considerably di-
minished.28 For evidence of another crime to be admissible, it is
generally held that it must have been similar to the crime in
question. 24 Although intent is a material fact, where the requisite
18. If knowledge (or any other issue) is apparent from the act, proof
of knowledge is entirely cumulative and unnecessary. 1 UNDERHILL'S CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE § 208 (5th ed. 1956); 1 WIoMORE § 27. The preceding authorities offer
support for the interesting assertion that such evidence is immaterial. If an
otherwise pertinent fact is proved and undisputed it remains a factual ele-
ment of the case, but cannot be considered material because it is no longer
in questton. It becomes material if disputed. See Comment, 7 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
463, 466 (1960). It is clear that a plea of not guilty does not put everything
essential to the crime at issue. McCoRMICK § 190, at 452 n.54; Comment, 70
YALE L.J. 763, 772 (1961).
19. McCoRMICK § 190, at 452.
20. If evidence that defendant was aware of a fact would tend to prove
the intent with which he did the act, it may be admissible to prove his
intent. 1 WIoMORE § 13.
21. 2 WIMORE § 306.
22. A defendant's prior attack upon the victim is generally admissible
to prove his motive for the victim's subsequent murder. Such evidence
shows that defendant has an active hostility toward this particular victim.
In contrast, a more general motive, e.g., drug addiction as a motive for
armed robbery, Is generally inadmissible. See Comment, 36 TENN. L. REV.
515, 517 (1969). For a case holding heroin addiction too tenuous to show
motive see People v. Bartlett, 256 Cal. App. 2d 787, 64 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1967).
23. 2 WIMORE § 302; Comment, 36 TENN. L. REv. 515 (1969); Note, 50
MARQ. L. REv. 133 (1966).
24. 2 WMORE §§ 302, 304; Slough & Knightly, Other V4ces, Other Crimes,
41 IowA L. REV. 325 (1956).
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intent is an inescapable conclusion from the act, it is uniformly
held that other crimes evidence is inadmissible. 5 However, if
defendant's evidence disputes the element of intent, the state
may use the other crimes evidence in rebuttal.
26
Another recognized exception to the exclusionary rule is the
use of other crimes to prove identity. If it is proved that the
crime charged and another crime both possess such peculiar
distinguishing facts which mark them as the handiwork of one
person, the evidence tends to prove that the perpetrator of the
other crime also committed the act in question.- Thus, if it can
be proved that defendant committed the other act, then it should
be admissible as evidence that he committed the crime charged.28
Although there has been some confusion about the ambit of the
identity exception, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions
restrict its use to crimes as unique to the individual as his signa-
ture; consequently, this exception is seldom applicable."
Although the other crimes exclusionary rule is uniformly
applicable to all types of crimes, the courts have generally
phrased one important exception to the rule with regard to sex
offenses. It is well settled that prior sexual acts with the victim
(or prosecutrix) in the crime charged are admissible to prove
defendant's lustful disposition for the victim.80 Comparable to the
25. No distinction should be drawn between crimes requiring specific
criminal intent and those requiring only general criminal intent. The con-
cept Is properly applicable to either provided that the requisite intent is
apparent from the act. For example, if defendant is proved to have com-
mitted the act of armed robbery, it is a safe assumption that he intended
the consequences of the act. In such a case, evidence of his other crimes
to prove intent in the crime charged is inadmissible. See 2 WIOMORE § 357.
26. See note 19 supra. See also, Comment, 18 BROOKLYN L. REV. 80 (1952);
Comment, 36 TENN. L. REV. 515, 518 (1969).
27. Slough, Other Vices, Other Crimes: An Evidentiary Dilemma, 20
U. KAN. L. REV. 411, 420 (1972); Slough & Knightly, Other Vices, Other
Crimes, 41 IOWA L. REV. 325, 330 (1956); Comment, 7 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 463,
474 (1960).
28. 2 WIomoRs § 306; Thomas, Looking Logically at Evidence of Other
Crimes in Oklahoma, 15 OiLA. L. REV. 431, 448 (1962).
29. Proof that defendant has previously picked up barmaids, driven to
a secluded area and committed rape, is generally inadmissible to prove
identity in a subsequent similar act. Such a common m6dus operandi is not
deemed sufficient to mark both crimes as the work of one criminal.
MCCORMICK § 190, at 449. For two Interesting cases involving the use of other
crimes to prove identity see People v. Peete, 28 Cal. 2d 306, 169 P.2d 924
(1946) and People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901).
30. McCoRMICK § 190, at 449; 2 WIoMOR § 398; Gregg, Sexual Offenses,
supra note 11, at 218; Comment, 40 MINN. L. REv. 694, 701 (1956); Note, 46
TL. L. REV. 336 (1971).
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proof of motive, repeated acts with the same person have such
particular significance to the crime charged that this proof is
deemed to be more than mere character evidence.3 1
The preceding enumeration is certainly not exhaustive of
the potential legitimate uses of other crimes evidence. The great
weight of authority holds that other "exceptions" can and have
been created.32 However, the authorities make it clear that
courts must follow the same procedures in handling the well
established exceptions or in creating new ones. In each case the
court must analyze the proffered evidence by examining the in-
ferences which would follow from its use. If this inquiry reveals
a significant relevance apart from the inference that defendant
has a disposition to commit this type of crime, the evidence may
be admissible.
It is important to recognize that a finding of independent
relevance does not automatically mandate the admission of this
evidence. The court clearly should exclude independently rele-
vant other crimes evidence if its probative value is outweighed
by its prejudicial effect. 3 Thus, the trial judge should balance
all the pertinent factors, and, in a close case, he should exclude
the evidence.34
31. Gregg, Sexual Offenses, at 220; McCoRMIcK § 190, at 449. The great
majority of jurisdictions recognize that the independent relevance lies in
the defendant's attraction to this particular victim (in consensual crimes,
the mutual attraction is even more probative). Consequently, only acts be-
tween the same parties are admissible. See, e.g., State v. Mason, 79 N.M.
663, 448 P.2d 175 (1968); People v. Askar, 8 Mich. App. 95, 153 N.W.2d 888(1967). A few jurisdictions admit a defendant's acts with persons other
than the prosecutrix. However, since the only inference drawn from such
evidence is that defendant has a propensity for illicit sexual relations, this
view is a deviation from traditional theory. Statistical studies prove that
sex offenders as a class are less likely to repeat their crime than ordinary
criminals. Thus disposition evidence in this area actually has less probative
value than in other crimes. This liberal use of other sexual offenses has
been criticized in Gregg, Sexual Offenses, at 231 and Slough, Other Vices,
Other Crimes: An Evidentiary Dilemma, 20 U. KAN. L. Rsv. 411, 422 (1972).
32. See MCCORMICK § 190 for other uses. That authority specifically states
that no listing could be complete because an appropriate fact situation will
create a new exception to the exclusionary rule.
33. See, e.g., Rule 403, Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence; State v.
Goebel, 36 Wash. 2d 367, 218 P.2d 300 (1950).
34. MCCORMICK § 190, at 452-54. Pertinent factors Include: the prejudicial
effect of evidence; the cumulative nature of the evidence; the existence of
any real dispute over the issue; the desirability of delaying the use of the
evidence until after defendant disputes the issue; the strength or weakness
of the evidence in actually elucidating the issue; the convincing quality
of the evidence that the other crime was committed and that defendant
committed it.
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The Standard of Proof
Inherent in the concept of independent relevancy is a show-
ing that the other crime did occur and that the defendant actually
committed it. Thus, the court must satisfy itself that the state's
proof of this other crime is sufficient before the ultimate deci-
sion of admissibility is reached. 85 Since the specific circumstances
of the other crime rather than the mere fact of its occurrence
give it independent relevance, the underlying facts are usually
shown by detailed physical and testimonial evidence.36 Because
such evidence is potentially confusing and prejudicial,8 the
courts have generally required the state to make a preliminary
showing that the evidence meets a high standard of proof.8
The great majority of jurisdictions require that the state prove
the other crime and defendant's commission of it by "substantial
evidence" or "clear and convincing evidence."-" Although not
easily defined, these terms clearly require more than a mere
preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.40 If the sufficiency of the state's proof is ques-
85. The sufficiency of proof is an important factor to be considered by
the court in its balancing process which ultimately decides the admis-
sibility vel non of the evidence. MCCORMICK § 190, at 452.
36. Use of a conviction based on a jury verdict to prove that defendant
committed the other crime is technically hearsay-opinion evidence. Such
evidence is, however, highly trustworthy and such convictions are used
both to show the act and to corroborate the witness' testimony. Comment,
24 OKLA. L. Rrv. 372 (1971). Rule 803(22) of the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence would allow such a use of prior convictions to prove any fact
essential to sustain the judgment. Facts not essential to the prior judgment
would have to be proved at the present trial by original evidence. If the
conviction Is based on a guilty plea, it would not be subject to the hearsay-
opinion objection because it is an admission. See People v. Formato, 286
App. Div. 357, 143 N.Y.S.2d 205 (1955).
37. In effect, this evidence tends to prove defendant's character by
showing specific acts. Where character is properly put at issue, the risk
of prejudicing and confusing the jury is deemed so great that proof of
character is limited to relatively inoffensive reputation evidence. See
McCoRMICK § 186.
38. See, e.g., U.S. v. Broadway, 477 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1973) which
adopted the "plain, clear, and conclusive" test and required a preliminary
examination of the evidence out of the jury's presence; Kraft v. U.S., 238
F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1956); State v. Hughes, 102 Ariz. 118, 426 P.2d 386 (1967);
People v. Edwards, 159 Cal. App. 2d 208, 323 P.2d 484 (1958); Shepard v.
State, 143 Tex. Crim. 387, 158 S.W.2d 1010 (1942).
39. See MCCORMICK § 190, at 451-52. See generally 29 AM. JUR. 2d Evidence
§ 333 (1967); 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 690 (1961).
40. People v. Albertson, 23 Cal. 2d 550, 145 P.2d 7 (1944); People v.
Lisenba, 14 Cal. 2d 403, 94 P.2d 569 (1939); State v. Carvelo, 45 Hawaii 16,
361 P.2d 45 (1961); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 146 Mass. 571, 16 N.E. 452
(1888); Caruthers v. State, 219 Tenn. 21, 406 S.W.2d 159 (1966). In civil cases,
"clear and convincing" is defined as "highly probable." MCCORMICK § 340, at
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tionable, it is generally recognized that any doubt should be
resolved in favor of defendant by excluding the evidence.41
The Louisiana Jurisprudence
The early Louisiana cases reveal that the courts employed
the rule as formulated by the majority of jurisdictions, that
is, all evidence which referred to defendant's other crimes
was to be excluded unless it came within such exceptions as
knowledge, intent, system, plan, or motive.4 The decisions rec-
ognized the prejudicial quality of other crimes evidence, and
thus the evidence was inadmissible unless it was "directly con-
nected" (independently relevant) to the crime in question.4
State v. Bates,4 4 a prosecution for theft, offers an excellent
example of the early judicial approach. In order to prove system
and intent, the trial court admitted the state's evidence which
tended to show that defendant had committed a similar theft
the day before the crime in question. The supreme court noted
that this evidence raised a great danger of "uniting evidence of
several offenses in order to produce conviction for a single one"
and further stated:
"From the nature and prejudicial character of such evidence,
it is obvious that it should not be received unless the mind
796. Since the fact of another crime is usually not an essential element of
the charge, but like any other evidence Is only proof from which the exis-
tence of an essential element may be inferred, it is not necessary that the
other crime be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970). However, sound considerations of fundamental fairness
require that the state meet a high standard of proof when using other
crimes evidence. Tucker v. State, 82 Nev. 127, 412 P.2d 970 (1966).
41. Labiosa v. Canal Zone, 198 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1952). Because the clear
and convincing standard is less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, most
jurisdictions will allow proof of a prior crime even though defendant was
tried and acquitted of the charge. However, this practice raises constitu-
tional questions in view of Ashe v. Bwenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), and some
courts have rejected the evidence for this reason. See, e.g., Wingate v. Wain-
wright, 464 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1972). This constitutional attack based on Ashe
has been rejected in Louisiana in State v. Boudoin, 257 La. 583, 243 So.2d 265
(1971).
42. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 45 La. Ann. 651, 12 So. 737 (1893); State
v. Thomas, 30 La. Ann. 600 (1878); State v. Patza, 3 La. Ann. 512 (1848).
43. See State v. Johnson, 38 La. Ann. 686 (1886) (other crimes evidence
excluded as "not pertinent to the crime"); State v. Palmer, 32 La. Ann. 565
(1880) (wanting in direct connection).
44. 46 La. Ann. 849, 15 So. 204 (1894).
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plainly perceives that the commission of the one tends by a
visible connection to prove the commission of the other ... -.
It was found that there was no such connection between these
two distinct acts, and, therefore, the conviction was reversed. 46
In State v. Norphlis,47 another theft prosecution, the defen-
dant had been apprehended for shoplifting. At trial, for the pur-
pose of proving system and intent, the state was allowed to
introduce fruits of prior thefts from the same store which were
discovered at the defendant's residence. On appeal, the supreme
court reversed the conviction, finding that the prior thefts and
the crime in question were isolated events which were not
encompassed within a single plan; therefore, they were not
admissible to show system. Since the facts of the act in question
left no doubt concerning the intent with which it was done, the
supreme court held the prior crimes evidence inadmissible to
prove intent.48
In the landmark case of State v. Rives,49 the supreme court
found that the pertinent provisions of the 1928 Code of Criminal
Procedure5 were not intended to upset the jurisprudence in
this area, and the admission of such evidence was still to be
determined by the principles applied in the earlier cases. In
this prosecution for cattle theft, the trial court allowed the state
to show that two months before the crime in question, defendant
was planning to steal cattle from a different farm. The trial court
had admitted the evidence for the purpose of showing intent
45. Id. at 853, 15 So. at 206, quoting from Shaffner v. Commonwealth, 72
Pa. 60, 65 (1872). The court further stated that the benefit of any doubt
must be given to the defendant. On application for rehearing, the court
recognized that the prior act did no more than establish defendant's teh-
dency to steal and thus was inadmissible.
46. Accord, State v. Ard, 160 La. 906, 107 So. 617 (1926); State v. Johnson,
38 La. Ann. 686 (1886).
47. 165 La. 893, 116 So. 374 (1928).
48. See also State v. Brown, 185 La. 1023, 171 So. 433 (1936); State v.
Ward, 166 La. 806, 118 So. 26 (1928); State v. Fontenot, 48 La. Ann. 305, 19
So. 111 (1896). In State v. Colombo, 171 La. 475, 131 So. 464 (1930), a prosecu-
tion for receiving stolen property (a car), the state introduced evidence,
showing that defendant had forged the bill of sale to his car. The court
held that this evidence was relevant to show that defendant knew the
property was stolen when he received it; therefore, it was admissible.
49. 193 La. 186, 190 So. 374 (1939).
50. La. Code Crim. P. arts. 445, 446 (1928). These are now expressed in
LA. R.S. 15:445, 446 (1950).
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and that defendant had a "mind bent on mischief." 1 The supreme
court reversed stating that the prosecution could not attack the
defendant's character in its case in chief, and in no event could
it show character by specific acts. Further, the supreme court
found that whoever had committed the crime in question clearly
had the requisite intent, and the proffered evidence could not
be admitted for this purpose in the state's case in chief.52
With respect to sex offenses, the Louisiana courts early ad-
mitted other similar acts between the defendant and the pros-
ecutrix as tending to show a subsequent act.58 However, the
admissibility of this evidence was generally measured by the
standards applied in most other jurisdictions. Thus, in State v.
Alexander,5 4 the court held that defendant's offenses with per-
sons other than the prosecutrix were inadmissible. 55
51. Although the court did not specifically rule on the use of the evi-
dence to show plan, the court did state that defendant's plan to steal from
a different victim two months prior to the crime charged simply did not
indicate a scheme to steal from this particular victim. Thus the opinion
strongly implied that such evidence is inadmissible for that purpose, which
is in accord with the majority of jurisdictions. See text at note 15 supra.
52. The court expressly distinguished between a rebuttal use of this
evidence from the state's use in its case in chief. Since no defense of lack
of intent was asserted, the evidence was inadmissible in rebuttal also. See
text at note 19 supra and State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126 (La. 1973), for a
similar distinction. Accord, State v. Alexander, 216 La. 932, 45 So.2d 83 (1950);
State v. Wilde, 214 La. 453, 38 So.2d 72 (1948); State v. Gardner, 198 La. 861,
5 So.2d 132 (1941); State v. Norphlis, 165 La. 893, 116 So. 374 (1928).
53. State v. Wichers, 149 La. 643, 89 So. 883 (1921) (carnal knowledge);
State v. De Hart, 109 La. 570, 33 So. 605 (1903) (incest). In State v. Ferraui,
210 La. 394, 27 So.2d 174 (1946), the supreme court upheld the state's use of
evidence showing that defendant had raped the prosecutrix eight days prior
to the act in question. Although the court phrased this exception to the
exclusionary rule as "showing defendant's lustful disposition," thus omitting
the crucial words "for the victim," the holding of the case is within the
traditional exception. See text at note 31 supra.
54, 216 La. 932, 45 So.2d 83 (1950). The court also held that intent was
immaterial to the crime of incest, thus defendant's acts with other parties
were inadmissible to show intent. The court distinguished State v. Cupt, 189
La. 509, 179 So. 837 (1938), because it was a charge of attempted rape. See
note 55 4nfra.
55. The case of State v. Cupit, 189 La. 509, 179 So. 837 (1938) is the one
significant deviation in the early jurisprudence. In a prosecution for at-
tempted rape, the state was allowed to show that defendant had raped
two other victims, eleven and two years ago respectively, prior to the act
in question. The supreme court upheld the admission of this evidence for
the purposes of showing defendant's lustful disposition and intent. Al-
though this evidence clearly showed lustful disposition, the rule was de-
signed precisely to prevent such a showing, and the great weight of
authority excludes offenses committed with persons other than the prosecu
trix. See note 31 supra. As to the other justification for admission-intent,
Cupit involved an attempted rape and specific intent to rape is an essential
element. Since the requisite Intent was not apparent from the act, most
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Prior to 1950, the jurisprudence strictly applied traditional
considerations of relevancy to each fact situation in order to
prevent unwarranted character attack. However, post-1950 cases
deviated from this precedent, and until the recent decision of
State v. Prieur," the more modern jurisprudence exhibited a
liberal approach toward the state's use of other crimes evidence
and expanded the traditional exceptions to the exclusionary rule.
These intervening decisions often admitted other crimes evidence
to prove knowledge or intent in cases where these elements
were apparent from the act itself, 7 and where no defense was
interposed placing such elements in dispute."
Under the label of system, these cases developed a new
exception to the exclusionary rule. The decisions defined crimes
of a system as crimes which are of like nature and exhibit similar
methods of operation. 9 Thus in a prosecution for armed rob-
bery, evidence has been admitted that defendant committed a
similar robbery reasonably close in time and location to the act
in question." Although this use of defendant's other crimes was
not generally recognized in the earlier cases,el it may well be
jurisdictions would allow evidence of other similar crimes for this purpose.
However, the state's evidence tending to show these other crimes was
extremely tenuous, distant in time, and should have been excluded for failure
to meet the traditional standard of proof.
56. 277 So.2d 126 (La. 1973).
57. See, e.g., State v. Evans, 249 La. 861, 192 So.2d 103 (1966); State v.
Howard, 243 La. 971, 149 So.2d 409 (1963); State v. Blankenship, 231 La. 993,
93 So.2d 533 (1957). Compare State v. Rives, 193 La. 186, 190 So. 374 (1939),
which rejected the contention that defendant's other crimes are always
admissible to show intent. In possession of narcotics cases, e.g., State v.
Skinner, 251 La. 300, 204 So.2d 370 (1967) and State v. Johnson, 228 La. 317,
82 So.2d 24 (1955), it has been held that knowledge is an essential element
of the crime, and that other offenses are always admissible to show this
knowledge. Under general authorities such knowledge is presumed from the
fact of possession unless defendant contests the issue. See note 18 &upra.
58. E.g., State v. Pesson, 256 La. 201, 235 So.2d 568 (1970) and State v.
Reese, 250 La. 151, 194 So.2d 729 (1967), allowing other acts of abortion to
show intent In a subsequent act. Most jurisdictions reject such evidence
unless the defendant asserts a defense (see notes 19 & 26 supra), 4.e., the
act was done to save the prosecutrix's life. State v. Cragun, 85 Utah 137,
38 P.2d 1071 (1934).
59. State v. Spencer, 257 La. 672, 243 So.2d 793 (1971). In this prosecution
for armed robbery, the state was allowed to prove that the defendant had
robbed the same victim a second time nine days later. Both crimes were
armed robberies committed at night In the same parking, lot.
60. State v. Carney, 260 La. 995, 257 So.2d 687 (1972); State v. Modelist,
260 La. 945, 257 So.2d 669 (1972); State v. Montegut, 257 La. 665, 243 So.2d
791 (1971).
61. Although the word system Is used in LA. R.S. 15:446, It was apparently
equivalent to plan, as evidenced by the phrase, "continuity of the offense" In
the, statute. The early courts clearly considered system to be synonymous
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justifiable if there is a close nexus in time, place, and modus
operandi between the two crimes ;62 however, some of these recent
cases admitted other acts which were not closely related to the
crime in question."
In sex offense cases, post-1950 decisions expanded the state's
use of defendant's other crimes far beyond the narrow excep-
,tion recognized in the early jurisprudence. Defendant's offenses
with persons other than the prosecutrix have been admitted for
the purpose of showing intent and licentious disposition. 4 Fur-
ther, dissimilar acts 5 and acts distant in time6 have been
admitted for these purposes.
The trend of the recent jurisprudence and its broad expan-
sion of the traditional exceptions to the other crimes exclu-
sionary rule has been reversed by State v. Prieur.7 The defen-
with plan. See State v. Norphlis, 165 La. 893, 116 So. 374 (1928) and State v.
Bates, 46 La. Ann. 849, 15 So. 204 (1894).
62. The relevance of this evidence lies in the inference that because
defendant has recently committed similar crimes in this area, it is more
likely that he committed the crime in question. This is mere disposition
evidence, albeit more probative than most because of the proximity in time,
place, and manner. For this reason, the use of system evidence has been
criticized. See Justice Dixon dissenting in State v. Bradford, 259 La. 881, 250
So.2d 375 (1971); Comment, 7 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 463, 473 (1960). Apparently the
court considers the probative value of such evidence to justify its use even
though it is highly prejudicial disposition evidence.
6. State v. Morris, 259 La. 1001, 254 So.2d 444 (1971); State v. Bradford,
259 La. 381, 250 So.2d 375 (1971); State v. Hurst, 257 La. 595, 243 So.2d 269
(1971); State v. White, 247 La. 19, 169 So.2d 894 (1964). In these cases,
the other crimes used as system evidence were months distant from the
crime charged. Whatever probative value this evidence possesses is seri-
ously diminished when the crimes are separated by such a time span.
64. State v. Whitsell, 262 La. 165, 262 So.2d 509 (1972); State v. Smith,
259 La. 515, 250 So.2d 724 (1971); State v. Hills, 259 La. 436, 250 So.2d 394
(1971); State v. Bolden, 257 La. 60, 241 So.2d 490 (1970); State v. Crook, 253
La. 961, 221 So.2d 473 (1969). Intent is not an element of these crimes; thus
proof of intent is immaterial and should be excluded. See LA. R.S. 15:444
(1950). See State v. Alexander, 216 La. 932, 45 So.2d 83 (1950), and Justice
Tate's dissent in State v. Bolden, 257 La. 60, 241 So.2d 490 (1970). Proof of
defendant's licentious disposition is clearly prohibited by the exclusionary
rule. Se note 4 supra. These decisions are based on State v. Cupit, 189 La.
509, 179 So. 837 (1938), a case involving an attempted rape which is distin-
guishable from these recent cases. See Justice Barham's dissent in State v.
Crook, 253 La. 916, 221 So.2d 473 (1969).
65. State v. Hills, 259 La. 436, 250 So.2d 894 (1971). See also Justice Tate
concurring in State v. Dimopoullas, 260 La. 874, 257 So.2d 644 (1972).
66. In State v. Bolden, 257 La. 60, 241 So.2d 490 (1970), the court allowed
the use of a rape committed two years prior to the act in question.
67. 277 So.2d 126 (La. 1973). In State v. St. Amand, 274 So.2d 179 (La.
1973), rendered the same day as Prieur, evidence of defendant's drug addic-
tion was admitted in a prosecution for armed robbery. There is language
in the opinion to the effect that since many armed robberies are associated
with drug addicts trying to support their habit, evidence of drug addiction
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dant was charged with the armed robbery of a bus driver. Over
objection, the trial court allowed the state to elicit testimony
which implicated the defendant in two other robberies. The first
of these was a similar armed robbery of a bus driver committed
two weeks prior to the crime charged, and the second was the
armed robbery of a service station committed a week after the
crime in question.
Justice Barham, writing for the majority, recognized the
great risk of prejudice inherent in other crimes evidence and
stated that such evidence should be inadmissible unless its
probative value exceeds its prejudicial effect upon the jury.
Thus, defendant's other crimes are inadmissible unless they
come within certain exceptions to the exclusionary rule, that is,
unless they are independently relevant. Further, it was held that
the unwarranted use of prejudicial other crimes evidence is
repugnant to the concept of fundamental fairness.0 8
The court found that the Louisiana statutes9 reflected a
conscious intent to adopt a limited approach toward the use of
other crimes evidence. To implement this legislative intent, the
court carefully analyzed the facts of the extraneous crimes to
determine the applicability of the statutory exceptions. There
was not sufficient similarity between the service station robbery
and the crime charged to justify its use under the system excep-
is admissible to show a motive for armed robbery. However, this evidence
was admitted in the state's case in chief without objection and the issue
was not squarely presented to the court; thus this language is clearly
dictum. It is unsupported by general authorities and is clearly irreconcilable
with the judicial attitude expressed in Prieur. See note 22 supra.
68. "Clearly, introduction of the testimony as to the service station rob-
bery is unwarranted by the statutes cited, and further, sound notions of
fundamental fairness embodied in our State's constitution necessitate its
exclusion." 277 So.2d at 128. There is support for the contention that the
unwarranted use of such evidence is violative of due process. See Spencer v.
Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 571 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). However, the nar-
row holding of Prieur is based on evidentiary law, not constitutional due
process.
69. LA. R.S. 15:445 (1950): "In order to show intent, evidence is admis-
sible of similar acts, independent of the act charged as a crime in the
indictment, for though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven
as a fact, it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction."
LA. R.S. 15:446 (1950): "When knowledge or intent forms an essential
part of the inquiry, testimony may be offered of such acts, conduct or
declarations of the accused as tend to establish such knowledge or intent
and where the offense is one of a system, evidence is admissible to prove the
continuity of the offense, and the commission of similar offenses for the
purposes of showing guilty knowledge and intent, but not to prove the
offense charged."
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tion.0 Because the requisite knowledge and intent were apparent
from the facts of the crime charged, the evidence was inadmis-
sible in the state's case in chief for either of these purposes.71 Fur-
ther, the evidence was not admissible under any other exception
to the exclusionary rule.72 The only inference to be drawn from
the evidence of the service station robbery was that defendant
had a bad character; therefore, the use of this evidence con-
stituted reversible error.78
In order to protect the defendant's constitutional rights which
are endangered by the state's use of other crimes evidence,74
70. The court continued the recent definition of system. See text at note
59 et"pra. It noted that the crime charged was done in the evening by only
one person, whereas the service station robbery occurred in the early morn-
ing and was done by two people. The testimony indicated that different
weapons were used in each crime. This close inquiry into the facts is in
direct contrast to the recent jurisprudence and marks a return to the earlier
judicial approach.
71. If the defendant had raised either of these issues, the state possibly
could have used such evidence on rebuttal. In Louisiana, the general denial
of a charge does not place every element of the crime at Issue, thus per-
mitting the use of other crimes evidence. State v. Moore, 277 So.2d 141 (La.
1973); State v. Campbell, 263 La. 1058, 270 So.2d 506 (1972).
72. Thus, although the opinion is somewhat vague on this point, it does
not necessarily limit the permissible uses of other crimes evidence to the
statute's enumerated exceptions of knowledge, intent, and system. This is
in accord with general authority. See MCCORMICK § 190, at 448. Louisiana
courts have admitted such evidence for purposes other than those listed
in the statute, e.g., motive. State v. Dowdy, 217 La. 773, 47 So.2d 496 (1950);
State v. Graffam, 202 La. 869, 13 So.2d 249 (1943); State v. Fontenot, 48 La.
Ann. 305, 19 So. 111 (1896); State v. Anderson, 45 La. Ann. 651, 12 So. 737
(1893). Further, State v. Rives, 193 La. 186, 190 So. 374 (1939), held that R.S.
15:445, 446 retained the prior jurisprudence which included the use of other
crimes evidence for purposes other than those expressed In the statutes.
State v. Moore, 277 So.2d 141 (La. 1973), decided after Prieur, considered
the admissibility of other crimes evidence for an extra-statutory exception,
identity, thus resolving the ambiguity of the Prieur language.
73. Although the conviction was reversed, the court expressed its opinion
of the admissibility of the second item of other crimes evidence, the prior
robbery of a bus driver, In a possible future trial. Because that crime was
committed by only one person at the same time of day as the crime charged,
at the same street corner and also concerned a bus driver, the court con,
cluded that this evidence might be admissible as system evidence. This
careful factual analysis is further indication that Prieur adopts a more
limited approach toward the use of such evidence than did the prior
decision. See note 63 supra.
74. "The spirit of our constitutional provisions, we believe, requires the
establishment of safeguards prerequisite to the admissibility of such evi-
dence. Our Constitution specifically requires that the defendant be given
notice of the offense for which he will stand trial so that he can know
the nature and cause of the accusation In order to prepare his defense.
Art. I, See. 10. It permits him full confrontation and cross-examination,
which require prior knowledge of the offense and the circumstances so that
he may adequately exercise these constitutional rights. Art. I, Sec. 9. It
requires due process and trial for the offense before an Impartial jury.
Art. I, Secs. 2, 9." State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126, 130 (La. 1973).
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the court established important procedural prerequisites to the
use of such evidence in future cases. Based upon similar provi-
sions adopted by the Minnesota courts,75 these procedures afford
defendant prior notice that other crimes evidence will be used
against him, thus ensuring him a meaningful opportunity to pre-
pare his defense and confront the witnesses against him.
"When the State intends to offer evidence of other crim-
inal offenses under the exceptions outlined in R.S. 15:445
and 446:
(1) The State shall within a reasonable time before
trial furnish in writing to the defendant a statement of the
acts or offenses it intends to offer, describing same with the
general particularity required of an indictment or informa-
tion. No such notice is required as to evidence of offenses
which are a part of the res gestae, or convictions used to im-
peach defendant's testimony.
(2) In the written statement the State shall specify
the exception to the general exclusionary rule upon which
it relies for the admissibility of the evidence of other acts
or offenses.
(3) Prerequisite to the admissibility of the evidence
is a showing by the State that the evidence of other crimes
is not merely repetitive and cumulative, is not a subterfuge
for depicting the defendant's bad character or his propensity
for bad behavior, and that it serves the actual purpose for
which it is offered.
(4) When the evidence is admitted before the jury,
the court, if requested by defense counsel, shall charge the
jury as to the limited purpose for which the evidence is
received and is to be considered.
'(5) Moreover, the final charge to the jury shall contain
a charge of the limited purpose for which the evidence was
received, and the court shall at this time advise the jury
that the defendant cannot be convicted for any charge other
than the one named in the indictment or one responsive
thereto."76
75. State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 149 N.W.2d 281 (1967); State v.
Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965).
76. State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126, 130 (La. 1973). Although the proce-
dural requirements do not apply to extraneous offenses forming part of the
res gestae, the admissibility of such evidence is clearly an other crimes
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Further, the court held that the evidence may not be admitted
unless the state makes a preliminary showing, by clear and con-
vincing evidence, that the defendant actually committed the
other crime w
State v. Prieur is of obvious importance. First, it expressly
reinstates the traditional limited approach toward the admis-
sion of other crimes evidence. The accompanying emphasis on
evidence problem. Therefore, under Prieur, a res gestae other crime is
inadmissible unless its probative worth justifies its prejudicial effect.
In defining res gestae, the purpose of the classification should be con-
sidered. The intent of the procedural safeguards-notice-indicates that
for this purpose, a res gestae crime is not necessarily the same as a state-
ment forming part of the res gestae for hearsay purposes. The opinion
does not define the term, but it appears to contemplate another crime so
closely associated with the crime charged that the defendant would expect
its use at trial. Prosecutors would be well advised to comply with the
procedural requirements until future decisions eliminate the vagueness of
the term.
There is an important discovery value for the defendant in these pro-
cedures. First, the defendant must be given written notice of the extraneous
crime which the. state intends to use. Secondly, for the state to make a
preliminary showing that the evidence is not repetitive, cumulative, or a
mere subterfuge for depicting the defendant's bad character, it will be
necessary for the trial judge to determine what other evidence the state
has to prove the issue, thus giving defendant an indirect discovery method.
For the impeachment use of other crimes evidence see the companion
article, 33 LA. L. Rzv. 630 (1973).
77. Before Prieur, neither the early courts nor the recent cases had
expressed a standard of proof. However, the recent liberal use of defendant's
other crimes had been accompanied by the use of highly tenuous evidence.
See, e.g., State v. Dotson, 260 La. 471, 256 So.2d 594 (1971) where the evi-
dence consisted of testimony that defendant was in a house "where others
may have been using drugs." In State v. Garrison, 260 La. 141, 255 So.2d 719
(1971), the witness stated that even though defendant did no overt act,
he thought defendant was going to rob him, See also, State v. Cupit, 189
La. 509, 179 So. 837 (1938) (hearsay opinion evidence). The adoption of the
clear and convincing standard brings Louisiana into the majority of juris-
dictions, see text at note 39 supra, and will protect defendant from unfounded
accusations of criminal conduct.
After this article was prepared for publication, several significant
decisions were rendered. The Prieur decision was followed in State v. Moore,
No. 52,720 (Louisiana, May 7, 1973). In a charge of aggravated rape, the trial
court had allowed the state to introduce evidence of a prior rape upon a
different victim in order to show "intent, guilty knowledge, and mode of
operation." In a 4-3 decision, the supreme court reversed. Justice Dixon
emphasized that other crimes evidence problems should be solved by a
double inquiry. "As for the prosecution of Napoleon Moore for the rape of
September 18, the evidence of the rape of September 14 must meet two
requirements to be admissible: (1) was it relevant to an issue of the case?,
(2) if relevant, was it too prejudicial?" The issues of intent and guilty
knowledge were found to be immaterial to the charge and thus the prior
rape was inadmissible to prove either. Because these two acts had no
factual peculiarities that would justify its use to prove identity or system,
the conviction was reversed. Thus the prior act was held irrelevant to a
material issue in the case, and no consideration of the second requirement,
the prejudicial quality of the evidence, was necessary.
However, in State v. Frezal, No. 52,659 (Louisiana, May 7, 1973), the
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relevancy appears to overrule many of the post-1950 decisions.
For the first time in Louisiana, it has been expressly recognized
that the trial court has the duty to exclude even relevant evi-
dence if its probative value does not justify its prejudicial effect.
Secondly, the supreme court recognizes the constitutional prob-
lems inherent in the use of other crimes evidence, and adopts
comprehensive procedures to protect the defendant from unwar-
ranted character attack.
William A. Jones, Jr.
OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE IN LOUISIANA-
II. TO ATTACK THE CREDIBILITY OF THE
DEFENDANT ON CROSS-EXAMINATION
In Louisiana, when a defendant in a criminal trial chooses
to testify in his own behalf, he may be cross-examined as any
other witness.' The state may, by certain approved methods,
then seek to persuade the jury to disregard his testimony by
supreme court affirmed a murder conviction in which the state had been al-
lowed to introduce evidence of a rape committed four years prior to the crime
In question. In a 5-2 decision (two justices concurring), the majority affirmed
the conviction because the defendant was charged with felony-murder; thus
the prior rape was admissible to prove defendant's intent and system to
commit the felony of rape, during which the death occurred. The two
concurring opinions expressly adhered to Prieur and appeared to severely
limit the majority's holding. The two dissenting justices stated that the
evidence was cumulative, irrelevant, and highly prejudicial and thus should
have been excluded under the holding of Prieur. The facts of the case and
a fair reading of the concurring and dissenting opinions lead the writer to
believe that the Frezal holding will be limited to its facts and that the
dominant judicial attitude, and thus the viable authority in future cases, is
expressed in Prieur and Moore. See also, State v. Jordan, 276 So.2d 277 (La.
1973).
1. LA. R.S. 15:462 (1950) provides: "When a person accused, or a hus-
band or wife becomes a witness, such witness shall be subject to all the
rules that apply to other witnesses, and may be cross-examined upon the
whole case." See United States v. Bland, 432 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1970); State v.
Cripps, 259 La. 403, 250 So.2d 382 (1971); State v. Guillory, 201 La. 52, 9 So.2d
450 (1942); State v. Dreher, 166 La. 924, 118 So. 85, cert. denied, 278 U.S. 641
(1928); State v. Toliver, 163 La. 1000, 113 So. 222 (1927); State v. Waldron,
128 La. 559, 54 So. 1009 (1911); State v. Guy, 106 La. 8, 30 So. 268 (1901);
State v. Murphy, 45 La. Ann. 958, 13 So. 229 (1893). For a discussion of the
general rule elsewhere, see 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 980 (Chadbourne rev.
1970) [hereinafter cited as WIOMORE]; and C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 132, at
278-79 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]: "[W]hen an accused
testifies he becomes liable to cross-examination under whatever rules would
be applicable to any other witness, and by testifying he waives his privilege
to that extent. Not only may he be questioned concerning all facts relevant
to the matters he has testified to on direct examination but he is also
subject to a searching cross-examination for impeachment purposes."
